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Environmental Law in the
"New" Supreme Court
by Robert Abrams
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 444-454. © 2007 American Bar Association.
In the 2006 term the United States Supreme
Court issued plenary decisions in four environ-
mental cases. As is usually the case, all four envi-
ronmental cases that reached the Supreme Court
presented nuanced questions of statutory inter-
pretation, most of which were intertwined with
administrative law issues. The decisions this term
are of unusual importance, as all have significant
aspects, either practical, precedential, or attitudi-
nal. Additionally, two of the cases exhibit the 5-4
cleavage, so common in this term's decisions, in
which Justice Kennedy is the outcome-determina-
tive swing voter. Not surprisingly, of the four envi-
ronmental decisions issued this term, the two
higher visibility cases fit that voting pattern, with
Justice Kennedy joining the respective groups of
four (Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito
on the right hand, and Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer on the left hand) once each.
Finally, on unusual occasions there are environ-
mental cases decided by the Supreme Court that
are of broader societal interest, and this term saw
the decision of one such case.
Environmental Cases in the Term
CLEAN AIR ACT
Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy, 127
S.Ct. 1423 (April 2, 2007)
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (April 2, 2007)
CERCLA/SUPERFUND
United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 127
U.S. 2331 (June 11, 2007)
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
National Association of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S.Ct. 2518 (June 25,
2007)
THE "EASY" CASES
Of the four cases, the most straightforward deci-
sion is United States v. Atlantic Research, No. 06-
562 (June 11, 2007). The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) is the statute enacted to
procure the cleanup of releases of hazardous sub-
stances into the environment. CERCLA contem-
plates both government-led and private-party-led
cleanup activities. It has as one of its organizing
precepts, the "Polluter Pay Principle." CERCLA
effectuates that principle by making those respon-
sible for the contamination strictly, jointly, and
severally liable for the cost of proper site cleanup.
The statute uses the term "potentially responsible
parties" (PRPs) to describe the class of persons
having statutory liability for these cleanups. PRPs
include owners and operators of the facility at
which the hazardous release occurred, generators
of the hazardous materials released into the envi-
ronment, and persons who transported the waste
to the site. Given the variety of parties that fall
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into the PRP class, it is a very unusual site that
has only one PRP. Thus, because modern tort
law principles (and CERCLA) allow for equitable
contribution among tortfeasors, a major part of
CERCLA litigation has been directed toward allo-
cating the loss among the PRPs.
OVERVIEW OF THE CASES
Case Subject Matter Primary Legal Rulings Alignment/Author
Dissent(s)
Duke Energy Clean Air Act Upheld differing Really 8-1 Souter
agency definitions of (Thomas concurred in
"modification" in NSPS the result, but it is
and PSD programs a dissent on a statutory
issue)
Massachusetts Clean Air Act CAA authorizes EPA 5-4 Stevens
v. EPA to regulate new auto Roberts (Scalia,
emissions of GHG; Thomas, Alito);
MA had standing to Scalia (Thomas,
raise issue Roberts, Alito)
Atlantic Research CERCLA § 107 can be used to 9-0 Thomas
(Superfund) seek contribution
Defenders of Clean Water Act & Allowed delegation to 5-4 Alito
Wildlife Endangered state for water permit Stevens (Souter,
Species Act program without ESA Ginsburg, Breyer);
requirement Breyer
The particular problem in the Atlantic Research
case involved the ability of a PRP who had volun-
tarily cleaned up a site without the intervention of
the EPA to recover contribution, or its equivalent,
from other PRPs. Atlantic Research had done a
voluntary cleanup of a federally owned site (a por-
tion of the Shumaker Naval Ammunition Depot)
that had become contaminated when Atlantic
Research removed propellant and other hazardous
materials from rocket motors belonging to the
United States using a pressurized water spray.
Atlantic Research sought to obtain contribution
from the United States which, under the statute,
is very clearly a PRP in relation to this site. The
complicating factor in this case was how the rele-
vant statutory provisions were written. CERCLA
does have a provision, § 113(f), that expressly
permits contribution actions. In a 2004 decision,
Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, 543 U.S.
157, Justice Thomas, writing for a seven-member
majority, had accepted a linguistic argument that
interpreted that section to require a PRP to have
settled liability issues with EPA prior to bringing a
contribution action. This had the immediate
result of undermining a PRP's incentive to do a
voluntary cleanup without EPA intervention
because statutory § 113(f) contribution from
other PRPs would be unavailable.
With § 113(f) unavailable to it, Atlantic Research
instead sued the United States under CERCLA's
primary liability section, § 107. That section pro-
vides that PRPs, in addition to properly incurred
response costs of EPA, are liable for "other neces-
sary response costs incurred by any other party." A
unanimous Court, noting the breadth of the phrase
"any other party" and looking at the "statute as a
whole" and the particular structure of the provi-
sion involved, held that language in § 107 permit-
ted the action in this case. The case is important
because it reenergizes the voluntary cleanup
process, a process that reduces health threats but
carries significant cost-many billions of dollars
have been spent on these cleanups, and more will
follow. The ability to allocate the loss more equi-
tably improves the statute's operation, even in the
(Continued on Page 446)
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eyes of those who think CERCLA's liability scheme
is ill-conceived. The decision "repairs" the problem
created by the rather crabbed reading given to
§ 113(f) in Cooper Industries without requiring
a statutory amendment.
The second "easy" case was Environmental
Defense v. Duke Energy, No. 05-848 (April 2,
2007). The case is easy to understand both factu-
ally and in regard to legal principles applied by
the Court, but the statutory and regulatory con-
text is very complicated. Over a period of years,
Duke Energy had totally replaced the steam boiler
tubes that drove the turbines in 30 of its older
power plants placed in service between 1940 and
1975 so that those plants could run more hours
per day than was possible under the previous
design. The change in steam tubes both extended
the life and expanded the generating capacity of
the plants, all of which were large, heavily emit-
ting coal-fired power plants. Concurrently, since
no improvements were made to the pollution con-
trol systems, the plants that were now operating
many more hours each year were also emitting
hundreds of thousands of tons more pollutants
each year than was previously the case.
The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act
(CAA) added, among other things, the Prevention
of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program that
applies in all areas of the country where the air is
meeting the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS). (As a rough guide, having air
quality that just barely meets the NAAQS means
that the air is clean enough to breathe "safely"-
when safety is defined as an acceptable level of
increased mortality or morbidity. Thus, even in
so-called attainment areas (synonymous with PSD
areas), there is considerable room for the air to be
cleaner and health risks lower.)
A key part of the 1977 amendment requires that
major emitting facilities in PSD areas of the
nation obtain revised operating permits that limit
emissions to the level achieved through applica-
tion of best available technology to the plant's
emissions. PSD "modification" was statutorily
defined after the fact by a technical amendment
that cross-referenced a pre-existing definition of
modification that was in place for the New Source
Performance Standard (NSPS) program of CAA
§ 111. PSD modifications were subsequently
further defined in 1980 by a duly promulgated
EPA administrative rule. That rule defined the
statutory term "modification" to include
situations that involved an increase in overall
emissions.
The complicating factor was that the EPA defini-
tion of "modification" for NSPS purposes was dif-
ferent than the PSD definition. The NSPS defini-
tion was not linked to increases in overall emis-
sion, but to the rate of emissions. Thus, under the
NSPS rule, the changes made by Duke Energy
would not trigger review as a modified source.
Eight members of the Court found this to be a rel-
atively routine administrative law case. Relying on
the methodology developed in Chevron USA v.
NRDC (1984), the majority looked first at the
statute itself and found that did not fully define
"modification" and, therefore, the case was one in
which the courts should defer to the agency inter-
pretation so long as that interpretation is "permis-
sible." On that basis, the Court found it "permissi-
ble" in the context of administering a program
aimed at preventing deterioration in air quality to
make an increase in emissions a part of a defini-
tion of an important operational term. In his con-
curring option, Justice Thomas noted that he felt
the case was controlled by the other initial phase
of Chevron under which courts determine statuto-
ry matters de novo when the statute is clear. He
believed the statutory definition of "modification"
in the PSD portion was clear because the cross-
reference to NSPS imported the identical defini-
tion, leaving no room for the 1980 PSD rule to
vary from the rate of emissions definition used in
the pre-existing NSPS rule.
An interesting aspect of this case was its political
context, because as the case went through the
appeals process, it was one that might fracture the
current Supreme Court along its by-now familiar
right/left cleavage, leaving Justice Kennedy as the
swing voter. EPA had never been very aggressive
in enforcing this part of the PSD program that is
sometimes referred to as "New Source Review"
(NSR). In 2000, the soon-to-be-departing Clinton
Administration EPA filed this suit against Duke
Energy and several other suits against other
power companies. All of these lawsuits targeted
heavily polluting facilities that had undergone
similar major modifications that increased emis-
sions in PSD areas without seeking revised per-
mits or coming up to best available-technology
emission control standards. Following the 2000
election, the Bush Administration EPA inherited
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those pending cases and did little or nothing to
prosecute them. Instead, EPA appeared almost
eager to lose them. For example, EPA declined to
appeal when Duke Energy won summary judg-
ment in the district court. It was actually the
intervening environmental groups that took the
appeal and moved the case forward. When Duke
Energy again prevailed in the Fourth Circuit, the
EPA aligned itself with the power companies and
opposed a grant of certiorari. Only after the Court
agreed to hear the case did EPA defend applica-
tion of the existing PSD rule. As a respondent,
EPA filed a perfunctory brief in support of the
environmental intervener-petitioners arguing for
Chevron deference to its PSD definition of major
modification. (See 2006 WL 2066660.) Thus,
there was room for a politically motivated Court
to side with a conservative, antiregulatory posi-
tion and adopt either of the decisions below and
their regulation-limiting result. The Court did not
do so. Instead, both wings honored Chevron def-




* 1972 enactment CWA § 402
- 9 factors that state must satisfy to obtain
delegation/transfer of permitting authority
- If EPA finds factors (related to state ability
to properly carry out the program) are all
met, it "shall" approve the delegation/
transfer
* 1973 enactment ESA § 7(a)(1), (2)
- All agencies of the federal government
"shall"..."utilize their authorities"..."to
insure that any action authorized, funded,
or carried out by such agency is not likely
to jeopardize ... any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruc-
tion or adverse modification of habitat of
such species."
In comparison to these two "easy" cases, which
resulted in unanimous or near-unanimous opin-
ions, this term the Court also ruled on two very
closely divided cases, both of which focused on
more controversial subject matter. National
Association for Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife, No. 06-340 (June 25, 2007), finds the
Court closely divided on questions of statutory
interpretation in a way that reflects the ideologi-
cal cleavage of the justices on matters of federal-
ism and on the reach of the Endangered Species
Act. Justice Kennedy voted with the majority to
limit the federal role under the Endangered
Species and Clean Water Acts. Massachusetts v.
EPA, No. 05-1120 (April 2, 2007), finds the Court
closely divided on both standing and on the per-
missibility of an EPA action (the nonregulation of
mobile source greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions)
under the Clean Air Act. In that case, the ideolog-
ical issues splitting the Court are of the utmost
importance, touching on nothing less fundamental
than the respective roles of the three branches of
government in facing one of the most pressing
problems of the coming century-regulation of
GHG emissions. In that case Justice Kennedy
again voted with the majority, but this time with
the liberal four. The result was a holding that
curbed executive branch discretion when there
was a pressing problem that Congress had brought
within the purview of the Clean Air Act.
The Defenders of Wildlife case sits at the intersec-
tion of the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). For each statute
there is a separate implementing agency: EPA and
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) of the
Department of Interior, respectively. Quite impor-
tantly, the specific statutory provisions involved
both use the mandatory verb "shall" in relation to
agency action. Additionally, on at least one read-
ing of the statutes, the two provisions make
inconsistent commands.
This case arose in relation to a state's request that
it be delegated authority (which the court refers
to as a "transfer" of authority) to issue permits
allowing discharges into the nation's waters. The
CWA § 402 allows EPA to make such transfers,
meaning that statutorily the EPA may delegate
this authority to individual states. Since 1972,
when the CWA took its present form including
this type of permitting program and delegation, 44
states have sought and received delegation/trans-
fer of pollution discharge permitting. The CWA
§ 402 lists nine criteria that a state must meet to
obtain transfer. Those factors address the state's
ability to operate the program consistently with
the statutory requirements Congress has erected.
EPA, if it finds all nine factors are met, "shall"
transfer authority. In this case, Arizona applied
for transfer after satisfying the nine factors.
(Continued on Page 448)
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In reviewing the Arizona request, EPA also took a
mandatory action required of it by the ESA § 7(a).
This Section requires that EPA consult with FWS
to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by such agency is not likely to jeopar-
dize ... any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species."
(Emphasis added.) (N.B.-You may recall the
broad reading given to the word "all" by a unani-
mous Court in the Atlantic Research case and
thus might expect the broad word "any," when
read in conjunction with the strong verb "insure,"
to be treated similarly, but that did not happen.)
When EPA consulted with the regional FWS office,
it got a mixed answer: (1) letting Arizona take pri-
macy over the program would not jeopardize
species as a result of decreases in water quality,
and (2) once primacy was granted, Arizona was
likely to be asked to grant permits that would sup-
port land development that would adversely affect
the critical habitat of several listed terrestrial
species. FWS then reasoned that because Arizona,
unlike EPA, is not subject to the ESA § 7 consul-
tation requirement, Arizona might issue permits
that did not consider or mitigate habitat impacts,
an omission that would not be allowed if EPA
were still running the program.
EPA wanted to move forward despite the FWS
opinion and followed procedures set out in a
Memorandum of Understanding of EPA and
Interior that referred the matter to the
Washington, D.C., headquarters of the agencies
for review and resolution. FWS modified its posi-
tion and issued a biological opinion finding no
jeopardy to species. The key conclusion was that
any potential threatened loss of habitat would not
even indirectly be a result of agency (EPA) action.
FWS further noted that EPA's continuing CWA
oversight of Arizona's actions could adequately
protect species. This protection came from the
statutory authority that allows the EPA to object
to the individual permitting actions of a delegated
state's program. With the no jeopardy biological
opinion in hand, and the nine factors of CWA
§ 402 satisfied, EPA transferred authority to
Arizona.
Under a special CWA provision that channeled
§ 402 appeals directly to the circuit court level,
the case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit by
Defenders of Wildlife. That court issued a 2-1
decision vacating EPA's transfer ruling. Several
issues and arguments became the fulcrum of that
decision and its subsequent reversal by a 5-4
majority of the United States Supreme Court.
First and foremost was a statutory argument that
the nine CWA § 402 factors are an exclusive list of
the criteria that may be considered by EPA in
deciding on transfer/delegation, and the ESA is a
tenth factor that Congress excluded from consid-
eration. Second was an argument based upon an
administrative rule promulgated by the
Department of Interior implementing the ESA
(see 50 CFR § 402.03, which reads, "Section 7 ...
[applies] to all actions in which there is discre-
tionary Federal involvement or control."). The
administrative law argument relying on that por-
tion of the rule first notes that the "shall" lan-
guage in § 402 means that EPA had no discretion
to exercise in ruling on transfer requests. The sec-
ond part of the argument joins to the "mandato-
ry" nature of the action involved in this case the
negative implication of the administrative rule-
that is, since the rule applies ESA to cases in
which there is agency discretion, and since there
is no discretion to be exercised under the CWA,
the rule removes this decision from ESA review.
This latter reading of the administrative rule
effectively rewrites the rule to add the word
"only" between the verb "applies" and the object
of the verb, which is discretionary actions of the
agency.
Writing for the Court majority that included the
right-hand four and Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito
agreed with both of those arguments. They are, in
effect, alternate grounds of decision because
either one would be sufficient to reinstate EPA's
decision to approve the permitting transfer/delega-
tion to Arizona.
The left-hand four dissented vigorously on both
counts, with Justice Stevens writing their opinion.
The dissent argued that on the statutory issue
there is no doubt that ESA was intended to be
superimposed on "all" agency actions. That was
clear in the statutory language and statutory
structure of ESA. It would have been almost
impossible for Congress to go provision by provi-
sion to every occurrence of the word "shall" or
otherwise indicated mandatory statutory duty of
an agency and spell out which required ESA con-
sultation and which were free of it. The nature of
what was being legislated-an overarching
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requirement-makes it rather plain in the eyes of
the dissenting justices that the controlling provi-
sion is that of ESA § 7 and that focusing on CWA
§ 402 inverts the statutory intent of Congress.
Justice Stevens's explanation of the proper inter-
pretation of the administrative provision is also
quite forceful. First, he argues that reading in a
wholesale limitation that excludes actions that are
not entrusted to discretion is inconsistent with
section 7, which the rule claims to be interpret-
ing. Second, the rule does not have the exclusion-
ary language that would deny it application to
mandatory actions. Third, in the rulemaking
itself, the language changed from "all actions" in
the draft rule circulated for comment to "discre-
tionary actions" in the final rule with no explana-
tion of the change, which implies that there was
not a substantive change intended. In addition,
Justice Stevens notes that the limitation is incon-
sistent with other sections of the same rule that
describe section 7 as applying to all actions of an
agency, including in one place a list of types of
actions that include mandatory actions. Finally,
Justice Stevens finds it inapposite to give Chevron
deference to EPA's view of a Department of
Interior rule. It was only outside this litigation
and well after this litigation began and consulta-
tion had taken place that Interior, for the first
time ever, stated, by issuing a letter of "clarifica-
tion," its view that consultation was not required
in this setting.
It is not necessary to embrace either of Justice
Alito's lines of argument to reverse the result bar-
ring the transfer. Moreover, it is also possible,
even likely, that after a remand with proper
instructions, EPA will still be able to grant the
transfer. Recalling how the case proceeded, the
two statutory "shalls"-both that of the CWA and
that of the ESA-received their due. EPA consult-
ed and fulfilled its ESA obligations when it eventu-
ally obtained the "no jeopardy" biological opinion
from FWS. EPA then fulfilled its § 402 obligation
by transferring authority to Arizona when it found
the nine factors were met. A party that had stand-
ing could and did challenge the decision on its
merits, but the real crux of the case should have
had nothing to do with the relationship of ESA to
CWA or even with the meaning of the ESA admin-
istrative rule. The issues for appellate decision are
the rectitude of EPA's findings that the nine fac-
tors were satisfied and the rectitude of the FWS
no-jeopardy biological opinion. Both of those
issues arise in the non-Chevron context of chal-
lenges to agency actions brought under the
Administrative Procedure Act and would be
resolved under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard of § 706(2)(A). On the facts as they seem to
appear, with a tenuous link between the transfer
and any habitat loss, the actions of both EPA find-
ing the nine factors met and FWS issuing the no-
jeopardy biological opinion would be sustained by
a reviewing court. Stated somewhat differently,
there was no need to take a big bite out of the
ESA to decide this case, but the Court majority
seems to have reached out to do so.
Thus, while Justice Stevens's dissent concludes
that Justice Alito's opinion is wrong on both
points (statutory interpretation and interpretation
and application of the FWS administrative rule),
at a minimum Justice Alito's opinion can be criti-
cized as unnecessarily broad. The likely effect of
that breadth is that this case will be cited as a
precedent for the proposition that ESA never
applies to any mandatory agency action or that
ESA does not apply when the word "shall"
appears in a statute. In that manner, the
Defenders case, if its broad approach is followed
in subsequent cases, will be one of the ways in
which the "new" members of the Court are
changing the Court's approach in the environmen-
tal field. This apparent effort to orchestrate a
change in direction should not come as a surprise.
Both Justice Alito and especially Chief Justice
Roberts expressed a very hostile attitude toward
the ESA during their time on the court of appeals.
Within the remainder of the right-hand bloc,
Justices Scalia and Thomas have previously
expressed concerns about the reach of the ESA
and dissented in critical cases involving its appli-
cation, such as Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter,
515 U.S. 687 (1995). Trying to single out what is
motivating the swing voter, Justice Kennedy, is
quite difficult. He has not shown the same hostili-
ty to ESA in the past, as exemplified, for example,
by his vote in Sweet Home joining Justice
Stevens's majority that upheld a broad adminis-
trative definition of the term "harm" in a Section
9 case that applied ESA in its most intrusive set-
ting, an application to private activities occurring
on private land.
(Continued on Page 450)
American Bar Association
Massachusetts v. EPA: CAA
CAA § 202 regulation of mobile source
emissions:
The Administrator of EPA "shall by regula-
tion prescribe ... standards applicable to
the emission of any air pollutant from any
class or classes of new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines, which in his
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pol-
lution which may reasonably be anticipat-
ed to endanger public health or welfare."
EPA argued both lack of authority to regulate
GHG emissions from mobile sources and
discretion to decline to do so.
The other closely divided environmental case
decided in the 2006 term was Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency. Massachusetts
v. EPA is the rare environmental case that by
itself sets this term apart and makes it special. It
is the most memorable environmental decision
since Hill v. TVA was decided in 1976 holding that
the Endangered Species Act, in accordance with
its statutory language, was a roadblock that barred
federal agency actions that would jeopardize
species. The element that sets this case apart has
very little to do with the environmental law issue
actually decided by the Court, another statutory
interpretation question posed with an administra-
tive law overlay. The real impact of the case is on
the public debate over GHG emissions, global
warming, and the consequences of climate
change. For those old enough to turn back the
clock and remember the galvanizing effect of the
first Earth Day and the spate of environmental
laws passed in its wake, Massachusetts v. EPA is a
similar watershed event. By putting the Supreme
Court's imprimatur on the scientific linkage of
GHG emissions to warming and measurable envi-
ronmental effects, it is almost as if the Court has
taken uncertainty and dithering out of the public
debate in this country and replaced them with a
unified will to act to address the problem. A spate
of legislation addressing GHG emissions, global
warming, and climate change seems certain to fol-
low and is already beginning to appear at every
level of government.
The case itself presented for decision issues of
statutory construction and administrative imple-
mentation together with a major standing issue.
The CAA empowers EPA to regulate mobile
sources, here, automobiles and light trucks.
Concerned about the serious effects of global
warming, a group of 12 states, including most of
the Northeast as well as California, Washington,
and Illinois, joined with local governments and a
number of private organizations to petition EPA to
engage in rulemaking and regulate automobile
emissions of GHGs under § 202 of the CAA. After
receiving an extraordinary number of public com-
ments (more than 50,000) related to the petition,
EPA issued an order declining to engage in regula-
tory rulemaking on this matter. See 68 Fed. Reg.
52922 (2003). As described by Justice Scalia's dis-
sent, the EPA decision rested on two conclusions:
"(1) contrary to the opinions of its former gen-
eral counsels, the Clean Air Act does not
authorize EPA to issue mandatory regulations
to address global climate change, see id., at
52925-52929; and (2) that even if the agency
had the authority to set greenhouse gas emis-
sion standards, it would be unwise to do so at
this time, id., at 52929-52931." 127 U.S.1438,
1474 (2007).
For ease of discussion, these two issues can be
termed "authority" (whether the EPA has the
authority to make such regulations), and "discre-
tion" (whether the EPA can exercise discretion
in deciding whether or when to make such
regulations).
The decision considered CAA § 202(a)(1), the
text of which is set forth above. Justice Stevens's
five-member majority examined and rejected the
reasons cited by the EPA for finding lack of
authority to regulate GHG emissions from mobile
sources. Principal among EPA's lack of authority
arguments was EPA's conclusion that carbon diox-
ide was not a pollutant. Congress defined the term
"air pollutant" as including "any air pollution
agent or combination of such agents, including
any physical, chemical ... substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the
ambient air. ... " (127 S.Ct. at 1460, quoting the
statutory "Definitions" section, CAA § 302(g),
emphasis supplied by Justice Stevens.) Describing
that statutory definition as "sweeping," Justice
Stevens found the EPA determination that carbon
dioxide was not a pollutant to be "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law," which was the standard of
review erected by the CAA § 307(d)(9)(A) for
cases of this particular type. Justice Scalia's dis-
sent points out that § 302(g) begins with words
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omitted by Justice Stevens that refer first to air
pollutants as being "any air pollution agent."
Although the opinion is not very clear, it may be
implying that "air pollution agents" constitute a
narrower class than the majority's expansive view
of "air pollutants." Justice Scalia then argues that
in § 302(g), when it uses the word "including" in
the definition of "air pollutant," Congress is using
the word in its permissive (rather than definition-
al) sense, so that whatever follows the word
"including" in the statutory definition may be an
air pollutant, but it also may not be an air pollu-
tant. From there, he argues that deference is due
to EPA's view about which chemical substances
are air pollution agents or air pollutants and
which are not.
The more contested statutory issue revolved
around the discretion vested in EPA under the
statute. The statute facially limits the obligation
of the administrator of EPA to promulgate mobile
source emission standards to those air pollutants
"which in [the administrator's] judgment cause,
or contribute to" the pollution that endangers
health or welfare. EPA, initially, in line with the
Bush Administration view, "judged" the predicate
causal linkage between mobile source GHG emis-
sions and climate change as either missing or too
uncertain to justify action. EPA, in its order
rejecting the petition for rulemaking and in its
brief to the Supreme Court, gave great importance
to a passage in a 2001 National Research Council
report (NRC) on climate change that EPA charac-
terized as stating that a causal link between GHG
emissions and climate change "cannot be
unequivocally established."
That particular EPA argument proved problematic
for two main reasons. First, it was not in accord
with the great weight of scientific studies on the
subject. Second, it was not supported by the very
NRC report from which it was taken. In a brief
submitted on behalf of several of the authors of
that same NRC report, those scientists stated
unequivocally that the phrase was taken totally
out of context and described in considerable
detail the numerous ways in which the NRC
report said exactly the opposite of what EPA
claimed. The equivocal language was inserted
specifically to respond to the way in which the
request for the NRC report had come from
President Bush. His request had explicitly asked
for a delineation of what was considered settled
science and what was still uncertain in the sci-
ence. EPA cherry-picked the language from the
discussion of what was still, in scientific terms,
uncertain and treated the quoted language as if it
applied to all of the areas of scientific inquiry
reviewed by the NRC report. That language was
not applicable to the great majority of the science
canvassed by the report, which unequivocally
found that anthropogenic GHG emissions have
caused and are continuing to exacerbate global
warming and that the amount of warming is
directly correlated to the concentration of GHG
gases in the atmosphere.
The tenor of the scientists' brief is not particularly
argumentative, but it is quite firm. For example,
the briefs first section is titled as follows: "The
Science of Climate Change Indicates that It Is
Virtually Certain that Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Human Activities Cause Global Climate
Changes, Endangering Human Health and
Welfare." The level of certitude could hardly be
described more forcefully, when the greenhouse
effect is stated to be "as certain as any phenome-
na in planetary sciences."
Oral argument made it plain that at least Justice
Stevens was prepared to accept the soundness of
the science linking GHG emissions (which his
majority opinion considered to be air pollutants
per § 202) to global warming and injury to wel-
fare. Mr. Garre, representing EPA, was engaged in
a colloquy with Justice Breyer in which Mr. Garre
mentioned EPA's reliance on the NRC report as a
reason supporting its exercise of discretion.
Justice Stevens cut in saying first:
I find it interesting that the scientists who
worked on that report said there were a good
many omissions that would have indicated
that there wasn't nearly the uncertainty that
the agency described.
And then, after a reply from Mr. Garre:
But in their selective quotations, [EPA] left
out parts that indicated there was far less
uncertainty than the agency purported
to find.
Reliance on the scientific position actually set
forth in the NRC report is the keynote of the
majority opinion. The very first words of the
majority opinion recite those most certain of all
the GHG propositions:
A well-documented rise in global tempera-
tures has coincided with a significant
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increase in the concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scien-
tists believe the two trends are related. For
when carbon dioxide is released into the
atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling of a
greenhouse, trapping solar energy and
retarding the escape of reflected heat. It is
therefore a species-the most important
species-of a greenhouse gas. 127 S.Ct.
at 1446.
With that view in place, the majority could dis-
agree with the EPA despite the usual role of
Chevron deference-there was no "permissible"
room for a judgment that mobile source emissions
of carbon dioxide did not contribute to pollution
that endangered public welfare.
The NRC report was not the only basis for the
EPA's decision not to engage in rulemaking. EPA
offered other, more policy-based reasons for using
"judgment" to decline to act. For example, EPA
felt that acting under § 202 would be a piecemeal
approach to a problem that needs a comprehen-
sive approach. Again, somewhat politically, the
approach that EPA called for was the "comprehen-
sive" approach of the President that relied on sup-
port for technological innovation, voluntary
nonregulatory private control programs, stronger
international controls than those currently in
place under the Kyoto Protocol, and continued
research into climate change mechanisms.
Without denying other approaches that might also
be beneficially pursued, the majority noted that
all the other bases offered by EPA as the discre-
tionary reason for declining to act rested "on rea-
soning divorced from the statutory text." 127 U.S.
at 1462. For the majority, the statute provided no
such latitude-"the use of the word 'judgment' is
not a roving license to ignore the statutory text. It
is but a direction to exercise discretion within
defined statutory limits." Id.
Justice Scalia's dissent accepts that premise in
part, agreeing to what is relevant in making the
judgment, but his opinion insists that "the statute
says nothing at all about the reasons for which
the Administrator may defer making a judgment.
... " Id. at 1473 (Emphasis in original). Scalia's dis-
sent, on that basis, concludes that the majority
has imposed a limitation of its own making that
interferes with the way in which agencies should
decide whether to enter into a regulatory field.
Massachusetts v. EPA: Standing
" Standing presents a tripartite inquiry:
"A plaintiff must allege personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly
unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief."
Roberts, C.J. (dissenting)
* State and its citizens whom it represents
- Suffered loss of waterfront land to GHG
warming-induced inundation from
ocean's rise
- GHG emissions would be less if EPA acted
- EPA action will reduce some GHG emis-
sions in the future, lessening future
warming-induced inundation
The standing issue seems more hotly debated
than were the statutory and administrative law
merits of the case. Through a series of interpreta-
tions of Article III's case and controversy require-
ment in the last 40 to 50 years, the Court's more
conservative members have expanded the consti-
tutional content of the standing inquiry from its
roots as a ban on advisory opinions and guarantee
of genuine adversariness to an elaborate jurispru-
dence that also includes justiciability and requires
(1) injury in fact, (2) a form of causal nexus
between the actions of the defendant and the
injury, and (3) redressibility of the injury by relief
that can be granted in the case. Chief Justice
Roberts's dissent succinctly frames those three
inquires in the language set out above. See 127
S.Ct. at 1464 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
The five-member majority and the four-member
dissent disagreed sharply on all three aspects of
the standing inquiry. The Court's modern standing
cases require that a plaintiff be able to demon-
strate a concrete and particularized injury.
Interestingly, the case that now stands as the
totem for this requirement is an ESA case, Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), a
case that involved extraterritorial application of
ESA. In that case Justice Kennedy concurred in a
finding that generalized claims of injury are insuf-
ficient. Justice Kennedy there stated his view that
Congress, in the way it legislates, affects the
standing analysis. He stated, "Congress has the
power to define injuries and articulate chains of
causation that will give rise to a case or contro-
versy where none existed before." Id. at 580
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, it was reasonably
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clear that the swing voter, Justice Kennedy, would
take a close look at the particularized injuries and
statutory delineation of injury or causation, if
Congress provided it.
The majority, with Justice Kennedy on board,
found concrete, particularized injury to the state
of Massachusetts, which according to uncontra-
dicted affidavits stood to lose a "considerable"
amount of public territory to higher ocean levels.
A rise in sea level of 10 to 20 centimeters had
already occurred. Justice Stevens's opinion also
recognized a cognizable injury to a state that has
a sovereign interest in protecting the "earth and
air in its jurisdiction" and the interests in those
resources of the state's citizens.
Chief Justice Roberts dissent for the Court's right-
hand bloc rejected both prongs of the injury-in-
fact analysis, finding that the state's claim of its
own loss was not sufficiently concrete and partic-
ularized, and that the parens patriae "booster" is
inapposite because state standing in those kinds
of cases is only present if the individual citizens
would have standing, which he did not believe
they did. In the end, the broader view of the Chief
Justice is made clear when he states, "The very
concept of global warming seems inconsistent
with this particularization requirement." 127 U.S.
at 1467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Returning to the tripartite standing inquiry, the
majority had little difficulty in finding causation
and redressibility. On causation, the argument
resembles a syllogism.
" There is a causal connection between
anthropogenic GHG emissions and the
injuries that result from global warming.
* EPA refuses to regulate such anthropogenic
GHG emissions from mobile sources despite
the power and duty to do so (that are con-
firmed by the majority's view of the statuto-
ry merits issues).
" Therefore, EPA is causing the injury.
Once the causal link is in place in that form, the
redressibility requirement is easy to satisfy with a
similar syllogistic argument:
" If EPA regulates mobile source GHG emis-
sions, there will be fewer GHG emissions
than would otherwise be the case.
" If there is less GHG in the atmosphere, there
will be less global warming and injury.
* Therefore, EPA mobile source GHG emission
regulation will reduce/redress the injury.
In further support of its position, the majority
cites precedents that hold a remedy need not
completely redress the problem to satisfy that
prong of the standing inquiry.
The Chief Justice's dissent responds by framing
the causation question more narrowly, asking
what is the specific link between the EPA failure
to regulate mobile source GHG emissions and the
ocean's rise that is causing the loss of
Massachusetts coastal land. The opinion then con-
siders whether Massachusetts has successfully
quantified just how much of its lost coastal area is
attributable to EPA inaction under CAA § 202.
Chief Justice Roberts finds that there are so many
confounding causative variables that the plaintiffs
cannot carry their burden on the issue of causa-
tion. That uncertainty as to causation becomes
the springboard for finding a lack of redressibility.
Here, the dissent points at the great uncertainty
of what will happen in the rest of the emitting
world that accounts for most GHG emissions. The
dissent also notes the possibility of technological
change and the likelihood that other major steps
will be taken to reduce GHGs in the future.
Cumulating those factors, the dissent concludes
those larger movements are the ones likely to
redress Massachusetts complaints, not § 202 regu-
lation of mobile source GHG emissions.
Justice Kennedy joins the left-hand bloc in finding
standing and an obligation to prescribe pollution
control standards for GHG emissions of mobile
sources. One colloquy during oral argument sug-
gested that this might occur, at least on the criti-
cal issue of injury. In particular, the portion of the
majority opinion giving special solicitude to states
suing for natural resource injuries suffered by its
citizens appears to have originated with Justice
Kennedy. During the oral argument, Chief Justice
Roberts was in the process of questioning Mr.
Milkey, the attorney for Massachusetts, about the
state's claim of lost land. Mr. Milkey was having a
hard time quantifying the extent of state land
being lost to the ocean's rise and the portion of
the rise attributable to mobile source nonregula-
tion. Chief Justice Roberts then asked what prece-
dents best supported Mr. Milkey's claim of stand-
ing. Mr. Milkey suggested a case with a special cit-
izen suit provision that was not particularly perti-
nent because this lawsuit did not arise under that
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statute. At that point, Justice Kennedy joined in
the discussion and asked whether states had spe-
cial standing rights beyond their own interest in
state land. Moments later Justice Kennedy sug-
gested that he viewed the century-old public nui-
sance case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, 206
U.S. 230 (1907), as the strongest precedent that
would give the state a special interest in raising
the legally protected interests of its citizens that
would constitute injury sufficient to support
standing. None of the many, many briefs in the
case on either side had addressed this possibility
or cited that case.
When the majority opinion was issued, Justice
Stevens adopted the Tennessee Copper rubric as
the leading ground for establishing injury in fact,
finding that seeking redress for widespread dam-
age to its territory constitutes a "suit by a State
for an injury to it in its quasi-sovereign capacity"
and an interest "independent of and behind the
titles of its citizens." 127 U.S. at 1454. In what is
a most interesting aspect of this argument, Justice
Stevens's opinion goes back to the rationale of
Justice Holmes that permeated Tennessee Copper
and other cases from that era when state resource
interests were affected-the right of states joining
the nation to be treated specially when they sued
asserting sovereign interests was a quid pro quo
for surrendering their rights as independent sover-
eigns to respond to injuries to their resources
with force.
Even if it is true that Justice Kennedy was the
source of the Tennessee Copper argument for
state standing, that fact does not fully explain why
the argument would be attractive to him.
Somewhat speculatively, it is possible to find com-
mon ground between the majority opinion here
and Justice Kennedy's Lujan concurrence. Justice
Kennedy is clearly on record as recognizing a role
for Congress in shaping the standing analysis in a
particular case. In this case, while there is not a
standing-affecting statute, as a member of the
merits majority he believes that Congress, on
these facts, legislated a duty to regulate that is
going unmet and causing widespread, perceptible
harm. Under the view propounded by the Chief
Justice in dissent, harm as widespread as that
caused by global warming results in a preemptive
conclusion that no one has an injury sufficient to
create standing to challenge governmental action
or inaction. In the event that Justice Kennedy (or
any other jurist) believes that a very concrete yet
hard-to-quantify injury is being imposed on whole
populations at once, by an action that Congress
does not allow, it is very unsatisfying to say that
no one has standing. The Tennessee Copper
approach cumulates those interests in a prima
facie appropriate suitor, the state, and avoids
the dilemma of governmental lawlessness that
cannot be challenged without opening a floodgate
of litigation.
There also is a possibility that looking at the
longer term, Justice Kennedy believed that it was
simply important for the Court to solidify public
opinion around the science on this issue and
usher in an era of more immediate action to limit
GHG emissions. Whether that motivated Justice
Kennedy or not, that is the way this case will be
remembered. Massachusetts v. United States will
be the symbol that announced an era of effort to
address global warming long after reams of addi-
tional legislation and administrative rules have
made § 202 of the Clean Air Act a forgotten relic.
Massachusetts v. United States on its own is a
case of vast importance to the environmental
world and to Americans at large. But given its
place as one of four significant environmental
cases decided this term, it only partially reflects
the changing dynamics of the "new" Court and
the possible implications this change may have
on environmental law for years to come.
Issue No. 8454
